Using quarterly financial statements and stock market data from 1982 to 2010 for the six largest Canadian chartered banks, this paper documents positive co-movement between Canadian banks' capital buffer and business cycles. The adoption of Basel Accords and the balance sheet leverage cap imposed by Canadian banking regulations did not change this cyclical behaviour of Canadian bank capital. We find Canadian banks to be well-capitalized and that they hold a larger capital buffer in expansion than in recession, which may explain how they weathered the recent subprime financial crisis so well. This evidence that Canadian banks ride the business and regulatory periods underscores the appropriateness of a both micro-and a macro-prudential "through-the-cycle" approach to capital adequacy as advocated in the proposed Basel III framework to strengthen the resilience of the banking sector.
Introduction
The 2007 subprime turmoil underscores the imperative for a sound micro-and macroprudential framework for banking regulation and supervision to build up resilience against severe crises and to ensure the stability of the entire financial system. 1 During this crisis, Canada's banking system performed much better than other industrialized countries. Even as high-profile banks in Europe, the United States and elsewhere collapsed, were bailed out, or underwent imposed take-overs-Fortis, Citigroup, UBS and the Royal Bank of Scotland are a few examples-not one Canadian bank failed or was openly bailed out.
In this paper, we examine the relationship between bank capital buffers and business cycles in Canada's banking sector. We first examine the cyclicality of Canadian banks' capital buffer with respect to business cycles, where the buffer (excess capital) is the size of the capital cushion that exceeds the regulatory capital requirement of the Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions (OSFI). Cyclicality of bank capital is defined as the co-movement between business cycles and bank capital. Positive co-movement implies counter-cyclicality and negative co-movement denotes procyclicality. 2 Therefore, to have counter-cyclicality between bank capital buffers and the business cycle, capital has to be accumulated in booms and lower in troughs. Second, we analyze the impact of capital buffers on banks' risk and performance, controlling for business cycles as well as for capital regulatory environments, namely in the period preceding the Basel Accords, during Basel I, and during amendments to the Basel I and Basel II regimes. Our research questions are as follows: (1) Do Canadian banks' capital buffers run counter to business cycles? (2) Are Canadian banks' capital buffers sensitive to changes in capital regulations? (3) How sensitive are Canadian banks' risk to changes in their capital buffer? (4) How do induced changes in bank capital buffers affect the performance of Canadian banks?
Our work departs from the literature on capital buffers in several ways. First, it uses an extensive database of quarterly data over a relatively long period (1982 to 2010) to study Canada's banking sector. Second, unlike some previous research, our study period covers at 1 Micro actions pertain to management actions at the bank level. Macro actions refer to monetary and other policies at the country level or higher. 2 See for instance, Illing and Paulin (2004) . least three regulatory environments. Third, we study the relationship between capital buffers, risk and performance simultaneously, developing a system of three simultaneous equations that link capital buffer, risk and performance within several business cycles and multiple regulatory changes. To our knowledge, this is the first paper to comprehensively address these issues relating to capital buffers in the Canadian context.
We find that Canadian banks are well-capitalized, exceed the minimum requirements for both the regulatory capital buffer (5.09%) and the leverage capital buffer (0.49%). These findings provide one possible explanation for how Canadian banks weathered the recent financial crisis better than banks in other countries. 3 We also document positive co-movement between Canadian banks' capital buffer and business cycles (countercyclical effects): more capital is being accumulated during booms. In exploring the role played by the Basel regulations in this relationship, we find that this positive co-movement is still present after the 1996 amendment to the Basel I Accord adopted in 1998, although it is more pronounced over the 1988-1997 Basel I period.
We also find a negative but not statistically significant relationship between variations in banks' capital buffer and banks' risk exposure. This finding is similar to that of Lindquist (2004) , who found support for the hypothesis that capital buffers may be considered as insurance against failure to meet capital requirements. Our results support the view that Basel and the leverage constraints imposed by Canadian regulators, principally the Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions (OSFI), have to some extent succeeded at better aligning Canadian banks' risk-taking with their capital base.
Finally, we find that the impact of capital buffer on the performance of Canadian banks depends on how performance is measured. When equity returns are used to measure performance, there is no effect. However, if returns on assets (ROA) or Tobin's Q are used as performance measures, capital buffers have a significant and positive impact on ROA and a negative impact on Tobin's Q.
We can then draw two main policy implications from the Canadian experience. First, rigorous and disciplined implementation of both risk-based and non-risk-based capital requirements may help mitigate the well-documented procyclicality associated with current Basel risk-based capital charges. Secondly, capital requirements should be higher during booming economic periods because this is when banks can accumulate more capital.
Conversely, a reduction in capital requirements during recessionary periods would be welcome since this may provide more room for banks to operate.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. In section II, we discuss our empirical framework. In section III, we describe the data and present the descriptive statistics. In section IV, we discuss and interpret the empirical results. In section V, we carry out robustness checks. We conclude in section VI.
II.
Empirical framework Shrieves and Dahl (1992) , Jacques and Nigro (1997) , Rime (2001) and others have used systems of two simultaneous equations to study the relationship between banks' risk and their capital. Kwan and Eisenbeis (1997) and Altunbas et al (2007) , in contrast, formulated systems of three simultaneous equations to study banks' capital, risk and efficiency (derived from stochastic cost frontiers) endogenously. Note that while our specification follows the latter approach, we depart from it, first by focusing on capital buffers instead of capital ratios and second by superimposing the effect of business cycles under banking regulation changes.
We use the following system of simultaneous equations: BUF j,t = f 1 (SIZE j,t , CREDIT j,t , OUTGAP t , RISK j,t , PERF j,t , BUFR j,t , BUF j,t-1 ,
RISK j,t = f 2 (VTSX t , TERM t , CV j,t , OUTGAP t , BUF j,t , PERF j,t , RISK j,t-1 , DREG t ,
PERF j,t = f 3 (CR3 t , SIZE j,t , TERM t , OUTGAP t , BUF j,t , RISK j,t , PERF j,t-1 , DREG t ,
where the dependent variables are as follows:
The variation of the capital buffer of bank j at time t;
The variation of risk of bank j at time t;
PERF j,t The variation of performance of bank j at time t.
These variables and the other explanatory variables are defined below. But before describing the variables, we give a brief overview of the regulatory background in Canada.
Regulatory background
Canada's banking sector is regulated by the Bank Act and is enforced by Canada's Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions (OSFI). This law was passed in 1871 and was supposed to be reassessed and updated each decade (Calmès, 2004) . The 1987 amendment to the Bank Act allowed banks to acquire investment dealers. In 1988, Basel regulations introduced credit risk-based capital requirements. Since then, Canadian banks have accounted for this risk when calculating their risk-weighted assets (RWA). In 1992, another amendment to the Bank Act allowed banks to buy trust companies. In addition, the Bank Act's review period was shortened from ten to five years (Calmès, 2004 
Capital buffers, risk and performance measures
We use three capital ratio measures to compute the buffer. Our first and main measure of the capital ratio is the leveraged capital ratio (CAPL). It is the inverse of the balance sheet leverage ratio and is obtained as the ratio of shareholders' book equity over total assets, as in Flannery and Rangan (2008) . The buffer with this capital ratio measure is denoted as BUFL and is measured by CAPL minus the inverse of the balance sheet leverage ratio cap fixed by Canadian banking regulations.
Our second capital ratio variable is CAP, which measures a bank's capital-to-riskweighted assets (RWA) ratio. We use this second capital ratio to calculate the capital buffer as the difference between CAP and the minimum regulatory capital requirement and denote it as BUFR.
We also compute a third capital ratio, the economic capital ratio (CAPE), using the value at risk (VaR) based on the bank's asset distribution. 5 The economic capital buffer BUFE is obtained as the difference between the bank's actual capital ratio and its economic capital ratio.
BUFL is our main capital buffer measure because it is easy to compute and to interpret. BUFR and BUFE, however, are difficult to obtain due to the lack of complete and comprehensive information and data to compute the risk-weighted assets and VaR of Canadian banks; these measures are thus less precise than BUFL.
We use three risk measures: total equity risk (TRISK), market idiosyncratic risk (IRISK) and the implicit volatility of assets (ARISK). We calculate TRISK using the standard deviation of daily equity returns over the quarter. We calculate IRISK using a GARCH (1,1)
in mean of conditional volatility on the residual from a multifactor market model over the last quarter of daily observations. This is similar to Song (1994 ), Flannery et al (1997 and Calmès and Théoret (2010), among others. 6 We add an additional factor for exchange rate risk to the market multifactor model used by Chen et al (2006) and Pathan (2009) as follows:
where R j,t is the equity return of bank j at time t, R m,t is the market premium, U I,t represents the interest rate risk premium computed as the difference between the long-term Canadian government bond yield and the T-bill yield, U x,t is the exchange rate premium computed as one minus the exchange rate of the Canadian dollar to the US dollar (the US dollar is the most commonly used foreign currency in Canada) and ɛ j,t is the error term.
The risk measure ARISK is the implicit volatility of asset returns ( V ) obtained using the approach of Ronn and Verma (1986) . Total asset value (V) and its implicit volatility ( V ) are obtained by solving a system of equations based on shareholders' equity defined as a call option: K = V N(x) -B N(x-V ), with x = [Ln (V / B) + ( V ²T/2)]/ V and K = V V N(x)/K, where V is the implicit total asset value (the first unknown), K is the market value of equity, B is the book value of the bank's total debt, K is the standard deviation of the bank's equity returns, V is the unobserved bank asset return volatility (the second unknown), is a regulatory parameter, T is the maturity of the debt (we assume 1 year), N(.) is the standard cumulative normal distribution function, and Ln is the logarithmic operator. The parameter equals 0.97 as in Ronn and Verma (1986) and Giammarino et al (1989) for American and Canadian banks, respectively. Gueyie and Lai (2003) have also used this constant in their study of bank moral hazard and the introduction of deposit insurance in Canada.
As a measure of performance, we use the banks' mean daily stock market returns (RET) over the last calendar quarter. We also use alternative performance metrics: (i) the return on assets (ROA) obtained as the ratio of net income over total assets, and (ii) Tobin's Q (QTOB) computed as the market value of equity divided by its book value.
Explanatory variables
We use the following explanatory variables: 7 -SIZE j,t represents the log of total assets of bank j at time t and controls for the size effect (Jacques and Nigro (1997) and Rime (2001), among others). We expect this variable to negatively impact the variation in the capital buffer and performance.
-OUTGAP t is a business cycle indicator. It is the cyclical component of real gross domestic product (GDP) obtained by applying the Hodrick-Prescott filter. We use the cyclical output gap instead of real GDP because it removes trends from time series variables.
-GDPG t is the quarterly growth rate of real GDP.
-CR3 t is the income concentration ratio at time t computed as the ratio of the total net income of the three largest banks divided by the total net income of the sector. This variable is used to proxy industrial concentration and competition in the banking sector (e.g., Bikker and Haaf (2002) , Beck et al (2006) and Alegria and Schaeck (2008) ). We expect this variable to positively impact performance.
-CV j,t is the charter value used to control for banks' incentives for risk-taking (e.g., Jokipii
(2009) and Keeley (1990) over the last quarter. The index includes the six Canadian chartered banks in our sample, as well as many other firms. We expect a positive relationship between this market risk and our six banks' risk measures.
-CREDIT j,t is the ratio of total loans over total assets and is used to control for the impact of lending activities on a bank's capital buffer.
-TERM t , the difference between the yield on long-term Canadian government bonds and the T-bill yield, captures shocks on the term structure of interest rates.
-DREG t are dummy variables to control for the stages of Basel regulations. DREG 1 takes a value of 1 over 1988-1997 and zero elsewhere to reflect Based I regulations before the amendment. DREG 2 controls for the 1997 amendment to the Bank Act and Basel II effects. The 1997 amendment to the Bank Act came at the end of that year and was enforced in 1998. DREG 2 takes a value of 1 from 1998 to 2010 and zero elsewhere.
-OUTGAP t ×DREG t is the cross-product of OUTGAP t and the regulatory regime dummy DREG t , and captures the interaction between business cycles and the regulatory regimes.
-BUF j,t ×DREG t is the cross-product of BUF j,t and the regulatory regime dummy DREG t , and captures the interaction between variations in capital buffers and the regulatory regimes.
-We also use bank dummies to control for bank-specific effects.
Econometric issues
In estimating our simultaneous equations, we use the two-step generalized method of moments (2SGMM) estimation technique in a panel data context to deal with potential endogeneity between variables. Since GMM is an instrumental variables method, we use the level and the first differences of the variables as instruments, and to tackle potential serial correlations, we use the first differences of the dependent variables as done by Blundell and Bond (1998) . We also include lags of each dependent variable as instruments to account for the simultaneity of capital buffers, risk and performance adjustments.
Our focus on changes in bank capital buffers, risk and performance lead to the use of only first differences as dependent variables, thus reducing the likelihood of spurious regressions since first differences of variables are all stationary in this context. Furthermore, the two-step GMM with panel data is more efficient than two-stage least squares, which is also a limited information technique but does not account for heteroscedasticity.
Finally, the fixed effect panel estimation has been favored to the first difference estimation option which is the only available option for the 2-step GMM in the panel data
context. There are two main reasons for this choice: (1) the system of endogenous equations that we have chosen is mixed, in that it considers both first differences and levels of variables, and (2) our database has a small number of banks, only six. 9
III. Data and descriptive statistics
As For all bank-specific variables, we have used data from Bloomberg, supplemented by data collected manually from the banks' reports. 10 For Canadian economic variables, we obtained data from various publications and other sources at Statistics Canada and the Bank of Canada. (2003) used 115 annual observations. The best case is Allen and Liu (2007), who used 480 quarterly observations. 12 In general, accounting data delay behind market data, but the lag is usually short. Since we are using quarterly data, we take one quarter as the lag.
From Table 1 , we observe an average leverage capital buffer BUFL of 0.49%, a regulatory capital buffer BUFR of 5.09% and an economic capital buffer BUFE of 3.50% for the six banks. The average quarterly stock return (RET) is 3.99%. The quarterly average ROA is 0.20% and average Tobin's Q (QTOB) is 1.45. Quarterly total equity risk (TRISK) is 1.45% and idiosyncratic risk (IRISK) is 1.47%. Implicit asset volatility risk (ARISK) is 0.93%. Table 2 presents the matrix of correlations between the variables. BUFL is negatively correlated to the three measures of banks risks but the correlation coefficients are very low, in absolute value not more than 6.92%. In fact, BUFL is negatively correlated with TRISK (-5.46%), with IRISK (-3.57%) and with ARISK (-6.92%). BUFL is negatively correlated to RET (-12.2%) and QTOB (-16.19%), but is positively correlated to ROA (3.34%), suggesting that the relationship between bank capital buffers and their performance may depend on the performance metric used.
Meanwhile, BUFL is positively related to BUFR (1.43%), but negatively correlated with BUFE (-6.30%). The correlation between BUFR and BUFE is 15.31%. These three measures of banks' capital buffer represent different capital requirement dynamics and one should be cautious in interpreting and generalizing results obtained with each measure. The correlations between the risk measures are positive: 64.12% between IRISK and TRISK, 10.81% between ARISK and TRISK, and 10.10% between ARISK and IRISK. RET is positively correlated with TRISK (5.36%) and IRISK (3.31%), and is negatively correlated with ARISK (-6.07%).
Finally, as seen in Table 2 , there are no strong correlations between the variables forming our system of equations. The risk of multicolinearity in this study is thus very low.
INSERT 
Do Canadian banks' capital buffers run counter to business cycles?
We use information about business cycles to create three data panels: (i) an unconditional panel that considers full business cycles without distinguishing troughs from peaks; (ii) an economic expansion panel, that only considers peak periods; and (iii) an economic recession panel, that only considers periods in the trough. For each panel, we calculate the capital ratios CAP, CAPL and CAPE for the six Canadian banks. We use these capital ratios to calculate the associated capital buffers BUFR, BUFL and BUFE.
Descriptive statistics for each economic phase, given in The graphs in Figure 1 plot capital buffers and the business cycles over the sample period. The graphs suggest a positive co-movement between capital buffers (BUFL and BUFR) and business cycles. In the case of BUFL, the relationship appears to change during the recent subprime crisis.
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE.
We further our analysis with a multivariate analysis using the simultaneous equations
(1-3). The results are presented in In the next section, we examine whether the countercyclical effect found above is sensitive to changes in the regulatory environment.
Are Canadian banks' capital buffers sensitive to changes in capital regulation?
Figure 2 shows business cycles and regulatory regimes over the study period.
INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE. Figure 3 plots the banks' average capital-to-RWA ratio over time, along with the balance sheet leverage ratio, measured by total assets divided by shareholders' book equity. As shown in panel A of Figure 3 , their average capital-to-RWA ratios increased over the study period after a secular decrease in banks' capital. 15 The increase is more pronounced in the periods leading up to regulatory change. Thus, we observe sudden increases, especially after the announcement of the Basel I Accords in 1987 and after the announcement of the amendment for the results) and DREG 2 for the 1996 amendment of the Basel I Accords and the adoption of Basel II (see columns 7, 8 and 9 of Table 4 for the results). In columns 10, 11 and 12 of However, the regulatory dummy DREG 1 alone has a significant negative impact on the variations of BUFL, while the dummy DREG 2 has a positive significant impact on BUFL.
Indeed, the balance sheet leverage ratio limit was decreased from 30 to 20 in 1991 and was increased to 23 in 2000. Also, after 2000, the capital-to-RWA ratio was increased from 8% to 10%. These capital regulatory changes probably helped boost the capital base of Canadian banks.
Having studied the behaviour of Canadian banks' capital buffers during different business cycles and changes in capital regulations, we now turn to the impact of changes in capital buffers on measures of Canadian banks' risk.
How sensitive are Canadian banks' risk to changes in their capital buffer?
Figure 4 depicts the pattern of Canadian banks' equity risk (TRISK), Canadian stock market risk (VTSX) and business cycles. We observe weak co-movement between VTSX and business cycles. The relationship between TRISK and business cycles is ambiguous.
INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE.
To address the sensitivity of banks' risk to changes in their capital buffer, once again we turn to our system of simultaneous equations. We use two additional risk measures: IRISK (the banks' market idiosyncratic risk) and ARISK (the implicit volatility of the banks' assets). The results are presented in Analyzing the regulation dummies separately, we find that DREG 1 positively impacts TRISK and that DREG 2 negatively affects it (see Table 4 ). This may be seen as evidence of To determine how capital buffer variations affect these banks' performance, we once again turn to our system of simultaneous equations. The results are presented in Table 6, where columns 1-3 are for equity returns (RET), columns 4-6 for return on assets (ROA) and columns 7-9 for Tobin's Q (QTOB) as performance measures.
For RET, the coefficient is not significant over the Basel regulatory periods. For QTOB, it is significantly negative, and for ROA, it is significantly positive. Thus, we observe that positive variations in capital buffers are not a significant factor explaining variations in banks' return on equity. With the other performance measures, we instead observe instead that a variation in bank capital buffers has a positive and significant impact on variations in ROA, while it has a significant and negative impact on QTOB.
V. Robustness Checks
In this section we verify the sensitivity of our results to different model specifications such as different capital buffer measures and the subprime crisis period which begins in 2007.
The positive co-movement between capital buffers and the business cycle observed in Table 4 holds for all measures of risk (see Table 5 ) and performance (Table 6) used.
Alternative capital buffer measures
We now turn to the sensitivity of the results to other capital buffer measures. The results are presented in Table 7 . Columns 4-6 of Table 7 give the results for BUFR and columns 7-9 for BUFE. 
Excluding the subprime period
The subprime crisis may introduce biases in our results because of the extreme volatility observed in the data during that period. In order to study the sensitivity of the results to the subprime crisis we perform our regressions excluding the subprime crisis period (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) to check if the crisis had a special effect on our results. The results available in columns 4-6 of 
VI. Conclusion
This paper examines the cyclical behaviour of Canadian banks' capital buffers (the difference between the banks' capital levels and minimum capital requirements) and analyzes its impact on the banks' risk and performance throughout business cycles and in response to Canadian regulatory changes during various Basel regimes. Our work departs from the literature on capital buffers in several respects. First, it stands out among studies of the Canadian banking sector in its use of a comprehensive dataset over a relatively long time frame . This sample period allows us to account for at least three business cycles and three major regulatory regimes: (1) We find that Canadian banks are well capitalized, which helps explain why they weathered the recent financial crisis so well. We document that bank capital buffers exhibit a positive co-movement with business cycles. This result holds even when we control for changes in regulatory regimes. We also find no strong evidence that variations of banks' capital buffer impact banks' exposure to risks and return on equity. By and large, there is no strong relationship between capital buffers and risk. Hence, the motive to hold an excess capital buffer may be driven by market discipline.
We can then draw two main policy implications on the basis of Canadian experience.
First, rigorous and strict implementation of both risk-based and non-risk-based capital requirements can help mitigate the well-documented procyclicality associated with current Basel risk-based capital charges. Second, increases in capital requirements should occur during periods of strong economic growth because it is during these periods that banks can accumulate more capital; conversely, during recessionary times, a reduction in capital requirements would be desirable since it may provide more flexibility for banks to weather downturns.
Figures 1a & 1b: Banks' capital buffer and business cycles in Canada
The right hand side axis gives values of business cycles measured by the cyclical component of real GDP. The left hand axis represents values of the cyclical part of capital buffers. To compute this last variable, we first adjust the seasonal components of capital buffer (by using the moving average over four quarters), then we use the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter to obtain cyclical components. The regulatory capital buffer (BUFR) is defined as the difference between banks' capital ratio and minimum regulatory capital ratio. The leverage-based capital buffer (BUFL) is equal to the difference between the shareholders' equity-to-assets ratio and the inverse of the regulatory ceiling on an unweighted leverage ratio. second graph (panel B) , the scale on the right hand axis is for the capital ratio (CAP) measure and the left hand scale is for the balance sheet leverage ratio measure (LEV). For the maximum leverage ratio (MAX_LEV), the Canadian banking supervisory authority fixed a balance sheet leverage ratio cap of 30 from 1982 to 1991. Late in 1991, the limit was decreased to 20 and this was the ceiling until 2000, when it was increased to 23 under certain conditions. The left hand axis gives values of the business cycles measured by the cyclical component of real GDP. The right hand axis represents the levels of average banks' equity risk (TRISK) and Canadian market equity risk (VTSX). To compute the last two variables, we first adjust their seasonal components using a moving four-quarter average, then we use the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter to obtain cyclical parts.
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Figure 5: Banks' performance and business cycles
The left hand axis gives values of the business cycles, measured by the cyclical component of real GDP. The right hand side axis represents the levels of banks' average equity return (RET). To compute the last variable, we first adjust the seasonal components of RET using the moving fourquarter average, then we use the Hodrick Prescott (HP) filter to obtain cyclical components. , idiosyncratic risk (IRISK) and implicit volatility of assets (ARISK); we use equity return (RET) to measure performance. The capital buffer (BUFL) is calculated as the difference between the shareholders' equityto-assets ratio and the inverse of the regulatory ceiling on an unweighted leverage ratio. All other variables are defined in Table 1 . Values in parentheses are robust standard deviations. Model 1 is shown in columns 1-3, model 2 in columns 4-6 and model 3 in columns 7-9. The 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels are respectively represented by *, ** and ***. This table presents regression results of systems of simultaneous equations of changes in bank capital buffers, risk and performance. The estimations are performed using two-step GMM regressions (2SGMM). Financial data are quarterly observations from statements covering 1982-2010. Market measures were extracted from daily data and converted into quarterly units. In this table, we use total equity risk (TRISK) to measure risk, and equity return (RET) to measure performance. Capital buffers (BUFL) are calculated as the difference between the shareholders' equity-to-asset ratio and the inverse of the regulatory ceiling on an unweighted leverage ratio. The regulatory capital buffer (BUFR) is calculated as the difference between the book capital ratio (CAP) and the minimum regulatory capital requirement. Economic capital buffers BUFE are the difference between banks' actual capital ratio and their economic capital ratio (CAPE). All other variables are defined in Table 1 . Values in parentheses are robust standard deviations. Model 1 in is shown in columns 1-3, model 2 in columns 4-6 and model 3 in columns 7-9. The 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels are respectively represented by *, ** and ***. This table presents regression results of systems of simultaneous equations of changes in bank capital buffers, risk and performance. The estimations are performed using two-step GMM regressions (2SGMM). Financial data are quarterly observations from statements covering 1982-2010. Market data was extracted from daily data and converted into quarterly units. In this table, we use total equity risk (TRISK) to measure risk and equity returns (RET) to measure performance. Capital buffers (BUFL) are calculated as the difference between shareholders' equity-to-assets ratios and the inverse of the regulatory ceiling on an unweighted leverage ratio. All other variables are defined in Table 1 . Values in parentheses are robust standard deviations. Model 1 (columns 1-3) includes the whole sample period 1982-2010. Model 2 (columns 4-6) only covers 1982-2006. The 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels are respectively represented by *, ** and ***. -0.0013*** 0.0027 -0.0010*** 0.0068 (0.0003) (0.0084) (0.0003) (0.0091) BUFR 0.0031* 0.0013 (0.002) (0.002) BUFL CREDIT 0.0017* 0.0020** (0.0010) (0.001) VTSX 0.0597*** 0.0188** (0.007) (0.008) TERM -0.0128* -0.0163**
